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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FLANDERS & ASSOCIATES, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
R. Duane Layton, 
Defendant/Appellee 
Case No. 960090-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM ORDER STRIKING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND 
JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, Circuit Court Judge 
R. Duane Layton ("Layton"), appellee herein, respectfully requests that this Court 
uphold the determination of the Third Circuit Court, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod 
presiding, on such grounds as follow: 
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2a-3(d), Utah Code 
Annotated, (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for the setting aside 
of the Trial Court's Order, which entered default against plaintiff, and which granted 
judgment to defendant on his counterclaim? 
2. Whether failing to calendar and appear at a pretrial conference is a reason specified 
in Rule 60 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, e. g. mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect? 
3. Whether the sanctions entered against Flanders & Associates were an appropriate 
remedy in light of the failure to appear at a properly noticed pretrial conference and Rule 
16(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
4. Is this appeal frivolous or brought for purpose of delay? Should damages be 
awarded to Lay ton? 
THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
For any question of fact, the standard of review in this appellate proceeding is abuse 
of discretion. 
The Circuit Court's decision regarding denial of the Motion to Set Aside is reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard, Katz v. Pierce, et al, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986). 
STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION 
IS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
Rule 16. Pretrial conferences, scheduling, and management conferences 
(d) Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or 
pretrial order, if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or 
pretrial conference, if a party or a party's attorney is substantially unprepared 
to participate in the conference, or if a party or a party's attorney fails to 
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participate in good faith, the court, upon motion or its own initiative, may 
make such orders with regard thereto as are just, and among others, any of the 
orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu of or in addition to any 
other sanctions, the court shall require the party or the attorney representing 
him or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any 
noncompliance with this rule, including attorney fees, unless the court finds 
that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that other circumstances 
make an award of expenses unjust. (Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of 
the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any 
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of 
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in 
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so 
corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been 
personally served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the 
defendant has failed to appear in said actions; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the 
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon 
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion 
shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not 
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a 
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a 
court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, 
order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
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Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions, the court shall similarly 
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The 
findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court 
following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41 (b). 
The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional 
findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made 
with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are 
made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised 
whether or not the party raising the question has made in the district court an 
objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a 
motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for 
divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties 
to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This appeal is taken from the Order Striking Plaintiffs Complaint and Judgment by 
Default, including but not limited to, the Court's Disposition Summary that denied 
Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment, which was entered on December 15, 1995. There 
have not been any motions filed pursuant to Rules (50)(a) and (b), 52(b), 54(b), or 59 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Course of Proceedings 
The Statement of Course of Proceedings in Appellant's brief is correct with the 
addition of the following to be included in Paragraph 7. 
. . . 7. A pre-trial settlement conference was scheduled by the Court on September 19, 
1995, at 9:30 a.m. Notice was sent to both parties. R. 23. Layton appeared and F & A failed 
to appear at said pre-trial conference. The Court imposed sanctions. R. 26.. . . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On April 11, 1995, F & A, filed a complaint against Duane Layton ("Layton") for 
breaching a representation agreement regarding legal services. R. 1. 
2. On May 12, 1995, Layton filed an Answer and Counterclaim. R. 9. 
3. On May 31, 1995, F & A filed a Reply to Counterclaim. R. 14. 
4. On July 26, 1995, F & A filed a Certificate of Readiness for Trial. R. 18. 
5. On or about August 7, 1995, Layton filed an Objection to Readiness for Trial R. 
21. 
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6. On August 8, 1995, F & A filed its Response to Objection to Readiness for Trial. 
R. 24. 
7. A pre-trial settlement conference was scheduled by the Court on September 19, 
1995, at 9:30 a.m. Notice was sent to both parties. R. 23. (Exhibit A). 
8. Layton appeared at the pretrial, and F & A failed to appear. The Court imposed 
sanctions by Striking F & A's Complaint and entering default on Layton's Counterclaim. R. 
26. 
9. On October 5, 1995, the Court entered the Order Striking Plaintiff's Complaint 
and Judgment by Default. R. 28. 
10. As a result of the lack of appearance by F& A, the Court ordered that F & A's 
Complaint be stricken and dismissed with prejudice for failure to appear and entered a default 
judgment on the Counterclaim against F & A, in the approximate amount of $2,000.00. R. 
35. 
11. The Disposition Summary was rendered on December 15, 1995, which found no 
factual basis for alleged application of the rule. R 149. (Exhibit B) 
12. F & A filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment. R. 33. 
13. The Court denied the Motion to Set Aside. R. 149. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. F & As failure to appear at the properly noticed pretrial conference was not mistake, 
inadvertence or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b) and the trial court did not err in denying the 
motion to set aside the judgment filed. 
6 
• • -M. - i-:r-:.!-'!-f' -,- ;.\civi;'.>n U) liraiit i>r U, r;\ Motions to Set 
Aside Default Judgments. 
3. The sanctions ordered by the trial court for F & A failure to appear at the properly 
noticed pretrial conference were an-appropriate exen :i.se of ji idicial discretion pi irsi lai it tc R 1 ilc • 16 
(d) Utah Rules of'Civil Procedure. 
I I lo fit iciii igs $ 'ei e i eqi lii eel i n idei R i lie 52 I txih 1 li It \s q / "Civil} V oa '.dur t " I he cii ci tit 
court judge had no duty to find facts upoii all material issues submitted for decision because the 
findings were waived pursuant tc)N.»J. V H -it-.* , : A A >, failure to appear and default. 
5. I? & A is responsible for calendaring and aitendii: *: pre-trial and cannot claim 
excusable neglect because of employees actions or failure to act. 
6 lit itj'i istic ;e ai ic I u: I :* ; ji l i ty b n i ,sl n ill it • = .si ill: si ic: I lid I " S: ' "s I *4otioi :i tc: S e t A s i d e tt I z 
Default be granted. 
/ I r \pp; \ i ! :!i\oi*ui- I'I nrnnyiH h •;• purpose of delay as defined under Rule 33 , 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ARGUMENT I 
THE CIRCUIT COTJRT APPROPRIATELY DENIED THE M O T I O N TO SET ASIDE 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
It was not an abuse of discretion in; nu inal u m r t to refuse to set aside the Default and 
Default Judgmen t under the factual c i rcumstances present here. 
N o substant ial dispute exists as to the events which led to the entry of the Default, the 
Defai lit Judgi i lent and the striking of I • & \ "s < :oi i lplaii: it I ' • & A failed to appeal" at a pi ( >pei ly 
not iced pretrial conference. Rule 60(b) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that 
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On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or 
proceeding for the following reasons; (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect;. . .(7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of 
the judgment. 
The law in this jurisdiction relating to the standard of review on the refusal of a trial court 
to set aside a default judgment is well settled. Airkin Intermountain, Inc. v ParkerA 30 Utah 2d 
65, 513 P. 2d 429 (1973), contains a succinct expression of that standard. In that opinion, the 
court states: 
For this court to overturn the discretion of the lower court in refusing to vacate a 
valid judgment, the requirement of public policy demand more than a mere 
statement that a person did not have his day in court when full opportunity for a 
fair hearing was afforded to him or his legal representative. The movant must 
show that he used due diligence and that he was precluded from appearing by 
circumstances over which he had not control. (Citation omitted, emphasis in 
original). 
The only excuse for the failure to appear offered by F & A was that they were 
experiencing a staffing change and that the matter was not properly calendared. This is neglect, 
but not excusable neglect as required by the rule. The trial court in denying F & A's Motion to 
Set Aside the Default Judgment and stating that "no factual basis alleged for application of the 
rule," determined that F & A had not used due diligence and that F & A was not prevented by 
circumstances over which it had no control. [Exhibit B]. 
When a motion to vacate a default judgment is based on excusable neglect, trial court 
must consider and resolve question of excusable neglect prior to it consideration of issue whether 
meritorious defense exists; furthermore, it is unnecessary, and moreover inappropriate to even 
consider issue of meritorious defense unless court is satisfied that sufficient excuse has been 
8 
st urn n Statt ? B) ? i im I 7 'hr -: u qh t JU ih State * Dei }t °) & * zu il Sei i ices v " I :;! uss* ;/m< m, 66 5 IE 2d 1053 
(Utah 1983). 
I ; & i. V'"s Bi ief ii \ RGt JIN 1EI I I I and the A D D E N D l Jl- I attempts to address the issue of 
meritorious defense, none of which should be considered on this appeal because the Musselman 
standard has not been met. 
A R G I I M E N T II 
T R I A L C O U R T S A R E V E S T E D W I T H C O N S I D E R A B L E 
D I S C R E T I O N TO G R A N T O R 
D ONS TO S E T A S I D E D E F A l J I T 
This conn has recently recognized the trial court's discretionary power in the case of 
Miller v. BrocksmithA N. ^ iJ. 2d 6°0 fUftih \pp mo-n T U J S c o u r t held "A trial court 's ruling on 
a mot ion to set aside a default involves the trial court's discretionary powei i ind we w ill :t lot 
disturb the trial court 's decision in such matters absent a clear abuse of such discretion." at p. 
693. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue in Katz v. Pierce, et al, 732 P. 2d 92 (Utah 
I VM)i ,. . . .; : J . k. ,\s u; i iv)WS: 
The District court judge is vested with considerable discretion under Rule 60(b) in 
granting or denying a motion to set aside a judgment . State ex rel Utah State 
Department of Social Services v. Musselman, 667 p 2d 1053 (Utah 1983); Airken 
Intermountain, Inc v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P. 2d 429 (1973). The court 
should be generally indulgent toward setting a judgment aside where there is 
reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to answer and when 
timely application is made. Where there is doubt about whether a default should 
be set aside, that doubt should be resolved in favor of doing so. But, before we 
will interfere with the trial court 's exercise of discretion, abuse of that discretion 
must be clearly shown. Russell v. Martell, 681 P. 2d 1193 (Utah 1984). That 
some basis may exist to set aside the default does not require the conclusion that 
the court abused its discretion in refusing to do so when facts and circumstances 
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support the refusal. Cf. Wilson v. Miller, 198 Kan. 321, 424 P.2d 271, 273 (1967) 
at p. 93. 
The decision of the trial court does not exhibit an abuse of discretion that would justify 
reversal. The trial court's decision exhibits an appropriate exercise of discretion consistent with 
the controlling principle adopted by this court. 
ARGUMENT IH 
THE CIRCUIT COURT PROPERLY IMPOSED SANCTIONS 
UNDER RULE 16 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
The undisputed facts show that this is simply a case involving a failure to attend a properly 
noticed pretrial conference and the imposition of sanctions as provided for in Rule 16 (d), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which states as follows: 
If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, if no 
appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, if a 
party or party's attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the 
conference, or if a party or a party's attorney fails to participate in good faith, the 
court, upon motion or its own initiative, may make such orders with regard thereto 
as are just, and among others, any of the orders provided in Rule 37(b) (2) (B), 
(C),(D). . . . 
The sanctions imposed by the court on F & A in this matter were to strike its complaint 
and to enter a default on Layton's counterclaim both of which are specifically provided for in 
Rule 37(b)(2) (C), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as follows: "(Q an order striking out 
pleadings or parts thereof, staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the 
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the 
disobedient party;" 
Although these sanctions of striking the complaint of F & A and entering judgment by 
default on Layton's counterclaim are severe penalties, this is not an abuse of the courts discretion. 
Generally courts have been reluctant to impose such harsh penalties because to do so unduly 
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penalizes a litigant foi 1:1 le i leglect oi oi i iissioi i of 1 lis attoi i 1 :::) I lowever, in this case tiu- attorney 
and the litigant are one in the same and no inequity or injustice results. 
i \ A u. Lm .hat striking its complaint was a dismissal under Rule 41 (b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. It was not. As stated above the striking of the com p = <'• ' : m-y 
of default and default judgment were an appropriate exercise of the courts authority under Rule 
ARGUMENT IV 
FINDINGS » \ RE REQUIRED UNDER RULE 52 I I I AH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDlIRE 
F & A argue that failure of the trial court to make findings of all material issues is 
reversible error, and relies upon KU. /<__. i ;dn Kules nfCi\ Procedure for this proposition. 
However, the language of Rule 52(c) (1) is dispositive of this issue. It states as follows: "(c) 
Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of 
aons of .. parties to ai i issi le of fact: (1) b> defai ill oi by 
failing to appear at the trial;" 
F & A's failure to appear at the pretrial and the entry of the default waived any 
requirement for fii.il;;.;' ^ -Hidings were required which we believe they were not. 
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ARGUMENT V 
ATTORNEY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTS OF EMPLOYEES 
The only excuse that F & A has raised for failing to appear at the properly noticed pretrial 
conference is that they were experiencing some staffing changes and the secretary did not get this 
hearing on its calendar. 
It is well established that work done by secretaries and other lay persons is done as agents 
of the lawyer employing them and the lawyer must supervise their work and be responsible for 
their work product or lack of it. State v. Caenen, 235 Kan. 451, 681 P. 2d 639 (1984). 
Although negligence on part of counsel may, in appropriate cases, be deemed "excusable 
neglect" for purpose of setting aside default judgment, negligence on part of one of the parties or 
its employees cannot be excused. Wagner Equipment Co. v. Mountain states Mineral 
Enterprises, Inc., 669 P. 2d 625 (Colo. App 1983). F & A may use this as an excuse, but it does 
not rise to the level of "excusable neglect" or "inadvertence" as required by law to set aside a 
default under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ARGUMENT VI 
INJUSTICE AND INEQUITY TO LAYTON SHALL RESULT 
SHOULD F & A S MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT BE GRANTED. 
Layton appeared in the trial court Pro Se, and has until this Brief attempted to represent 
himself against F & A, licensed attorneys. However, due to the complexities of the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure and this court, Layton has been forced to obtain counsel to assist with 
finally resolving this matter at this court. 
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In ' i J 111 1 pili nib, inn.in in illou an . m o m n to continue to harass and cause undue 
emot ional and financial hardship upon a prior client by setting aside this judgment . The facts in 
this matter are clear. Layton took time off from work to appear and the attorneys (F & A) failed 
to apre-:- .* * -'retrial conference. Both parties had notice c f the conseqi lences of tl lei r faili ire to 
appear and mus t be subject to the sanctions imposed To do otherwise would be an injustice and 
i i icqi lit) ir to I aj !:c i i 
ARGUMENT VII 
THIS APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS OR FOR P U R P O S E OF DELAY, 
AS DEFINED UNDER RULE 33, UTA HRULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDl RE 
It is apparent livm (he undisputed facts tlui ihis appeal is not grounded in fact. Further, 
the exist ing law is cieai .:,:• area and i • x ,\ \US not made arguments , good faith or otherwise, 
to extend, modify, or reverse the existing law. It appears this appeal has been brought to further 
harass Layton, delay his judgment and collection thereof, to gain an unfair advantage of a pro se 
hu^ai ;;i ease I ,a> ton' s costs « ' ... 3- , (i 
purposes under Rule 33 , Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, Layton respectfully 
reqi lests tl lat tl le t :;: i n I: i • 'ai ( 1 dai i: lages foi dot ible tl ie costs allowed i \mu-v me provisions oi Kiue 
34, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
F & A has not satisfied the requirements of Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Counsels failure to appear at the properly noticed pretrial conference was not inadvertence or 
exci isable neglet ;t I o alio ; ai I attoi i ie> to a > 'oid tl leii legal responsibilities and thei i seek to set 
aside judgments at this court constitutes a great injustice to Layton and should not be granted. 
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The Circuit Court did not commit reversible error by not entering findings in this matter. This 
appeal is frivolous and brought for purposes of delay only and damages should be awarded. 
WHEREFORE, Layton respectfully requests that this Court uphold the denial of the 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment, and award Layton attorneys fees, damages and costs to defend 
this action and grant such further relief as the court deems just and proper. 
DATED this /3_ day of July, 1996. 
SHAUNA L. KERR 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
14 
I KK r iM< • i r i i I iiiih • i ' i n , ill i iiii 
y*f 
/ - y -
.i V-.-M:-- . : 'H I I I K ; _'_ (lav . ; u, *,. . -"i , >>u\eu the Inn L , n g Br ie f o f 
Appellee on the following, by depositing copies thereof in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows: 
BRENDA L. FLANDERS 
FLANDERS & ASSOCIATES 
56 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake city, Utah 84111 
*£&>&-* 
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ORDER FOR( E-TRIAL SETTLEMENT 
Plaintiff CONFERENCE AND FOR APPEARANCE 
OF COUNSEL 
VS. (read carefully) 
R . hM/V. Ul\lW\ CIVIL NO. "VoOcmOlOtyJ 
H o n o r a b l e J u d g e S t e p h e n L. H e n r i o d 
The court, on its own motion, hereby orders that a pre-trial settlement conference be held in the above 
entitled case as follows: 
DATE: Qrpfcrnhf.riq^^ TIME: ^• 3 0 i i m _ _ 
PLACE: 77i;Vtf grc///7 Gwr/. S.L DepU ADDRESS: 451 South 200 Easf 
Fifth Floor, Judges chambers SLC. Ut 84111 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD BE IN ATTENDANCE UNLESS 
PRIOR TO SAID CONFERENCE, THE COURT EXCUSES THE APPEARANCE OF ANY PARTY, THIS 
INCLUDES DEFENDANTS WHO ARE REPRRSENTED BY INSURANCE COMPANY COUNSEL. Corporate 
parties should be represented by a responsible officer authorized to personally make decisions for the settlement of 
the case. The attorney who will try the case shall attend unless excused for good cause shown. Every attorney has a 
duty to be thoroughly familiar with the relevant evidence and must be authorized to personally settle the case. 
If counsels) are unable to meet the scheduled time, the counsel(s) are directed to contact the Judge or his/her 
clerk as soon as the fact is known and a time convenient to all will be arranged. The responsibility of contacting other 
parties receiving the notice to arrange such a change in schedule will be that of the person requesting the change. 
The purpose of the conference is to effect a settlement of the case. Attorney's are directed to discuss 
settlement with their clients and each other prior to the appearance at the settlement conference, to be realistic in their 
approach to settlement and to be prepared to advise the Judge of their efforts towards settlement and the problems 
involved. If a settlement is agreed upon prior to the conference, counsel is directed to prepare a stipulation of 
settlement to present at or prior to the conference, or to appear and present such settlement into the record. 
Other problems such as withdrawal of counsel, failure to respond to discovery, witness problems, trial 
conflict, requests for continuances, etc., wiJl be resolved at the conference. Motions for summary judgment will not 
be heard. 
If counsel fails to appear or it settlement efforts are thwarted by the non-appearance of a party, attorney's fee 
may be allowed to opposing parties and the court may enter a default against the non-appearing party or what ever 
other sanctions seem just and appropriate. 
Copi&TSf this notice were mailed to the following parties at the addresses indicated: 
DATED: Kwa%t3iBcf2 BY: VJ .oun J YxhjL> 
MMd I- RanditL \>.f\'.ont knjJan 
Cknft-C. '^axu.ndoz 0.f). fioK' ^-335 
3fe past ^rcadiucuj fin tt^vd 
Exhibit A 
jLJtuuKxjr 1KUU1T COURT, S T A ^ OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
DISPOSITION SUMMARY 
The «A plaintiffs • defendants 
Case#_ l^MMLtV 
Motion fV/to 0j}\ (Xn7](h1 [d'M/xllrfr 
as follows. vJ Kj 
has been decided 
K Denied • Granted 
H ATP/PLA tc prepare oi dei Q ATD/DEF to prepare order 
Comments: 
/frj Ajj^U^ A*S tJ^J^jf f*7 
rf^^^Gfa&^n. <rf r"w sujtLe . 
ST* 
UtotTssit 
...,_% tfeCtostOast,.9teteo» 
wum, >-»^ > v^"« vwynSaf l i late Department cto fnsfey 
corti^U%l^i9^ntit%a^ 39c) foregoing is a true ar t feH 
copy of^^^^Mg^kni on file In my office a$ mteh 
Witness my haft* and seal of said Court This i& • 
day of L=J^jL^kt£kii^ _ _ 19 /£ 
Deputy 
Date: /2>>-/<rh <f~ 
Stephen L. Henriod 
Third Circuit Court Judge 
Exhibit B 
